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CASE NOTES
federal courts are establishing precedent to the effect that the employer
may lock out his union employees to counteract a whipsaw, unless the
purpose of the lockout is to interfere with the concerted activities pro-
tected by Section 7, or to escape the duty to bargain collectively, as pre-
scribed by Section 8(d) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act.8
SALES-BLANK ENDORSEMENTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE
TITLE CERTIFICATES
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant finance company
to recover possession of an automobile which had been wrongfully
mortgaged by a used car dealer who had agreed to sell that vehicle for
the plaintiff owner. The owner had delivered two vehicles to the used
car dealer together with the title certificates endorsed in blank, but with
the spaces for the names of the assignees left blank. The dealer was to
fill in the name of the assignee for each vehicle when he had made the
sale and was also to have the certificates notarized. Before any sale had
been made, the dealer gave chattel mortgages on the two automobiles
to the finance company on the strength of the two title certificates which
had been endorsed in blank. The dealer later defaulted on the mortgages,
and the finance company took possession of one of the two automobiles.
The court held that failure to fill the blank spaces on the certificates and
the failure to have the certificates notarized made the certificates defective
on their face. Hawkins v. M. & 1. Finance Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 77 S.E.
2d 669 (1953).
The defendant argued that the owner had estopped himself from claim-
ing ownership as against the finance company by cloaking the dealer
with indicia of ownership. Testimony was introduced that the custom of
used car dealers is to buy old cars without a formal assignment made
to the dealer by the former owner. Upon resale of the vehicle, the name
of the new buyer is inserted in the space reserved for the name of the
assignee, thus creating the impression that the transaction took place
between the original owner and the subsequent buyer without inter-
mediate ownership by the dealer.
The court discussed the North Carolina statute" regulating the transfer
of title to automobiles and held, that compliance with the statute was
required in the assignment of the certificate of title before the certificate
could be an indicium of ownership. The court stated that the assignment
of title by the owner's blank endorsement, which does not name the
88 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. S 101 (1947).
1 N.C. Gen. Stat. (recompiled, 1953) c. 20, S 72.
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purchaser, was fatally defective and that the incomplete assignment gave
the finance company constructive notice of the holder's want of title.
It should be noted that the same statute had been interpreted in Caro-
lina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co.2 as not affecting the legality or
effectiveness of a sale made without substantial compliance with the
statutory requirements. The court said: "A sale of personal property is
not required to be evidenced by any written instrument in order to be
valid. This rule had been of such long standing prior to the enactment
of the Motor Vehicle Registration Act, we cannot assume that the legisla-
ture intended to change this rule, unless it says so." '3
The existence of similar statutes in other states has led to varying in-
terpretations. In Missouri, the statute4 specifically provides that the sale
of any motor vehicle without a proper assignment of the certificate of
ownership shall be fraudulent and void. In an interpretation of this pro-
vision it was held that such a purported sale without a valid assignment
of the certificate of title would serve only to create an executory con-
tract which might be repudiated by either seller or buyer.5
The result is not so clear where such a mandatory provision does not
exist. Until recently, the courts in other jurisdictions had tended to fol-
low a line of reasoning similar to that used in Pageanas v. Mixon Motor
Co.6 where the court ruled that the Illinois title registration statute7 is
not a recording statute and does not affect the sale of a vehicle which
is otherwise valid.
In Washington, Hutson v. Walker et ux.8 held that one who delivers
both a certificate of title and a separate bill of sale both endorsed in blank
to a wrongdoer together with the automobile has estopped himself as
against a subsequent purchaser without notice. This case was apparently
overruled in Richardson v. Seattle First National Bank,9 on a similar set
of facts. However, in Hutson v. Walker,'0 it must be noted that the
wrongdoer had subsequently inserted his own name in the space provided
2 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925).
8 129 S.E. 414, 416 (1925).
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) S 301.2 10, subd. 4.
5 Smith v. G.F.C. Corp., 255 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. App., 1953).
6 344 1. App. 446, 101 N.E. 2d 280 (1951).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 95 , S 80 provides that the owner of a motor vehicle for
which a certificate of title is required shall not sell the vehicle unless he has obtained
a certificate of title thereto nor unless he shall in every respect comply with the re-
quirements of this section.
8 37 Wash. 2d 12, 221 P. 2d 506 (1950).
938 Wash. 2d 314, 229 P. 2d 341 (1951).
10 37 Wash. 2d 12, 221 P. 2d 506 (1950).
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for the name of the buyer on the bill of sale and had presented the bill
of sale regular on its face to the subsequent purchaser. It was held then
that the bill of sale was sufficient indicium of ownership notwithstanding
the defectiveness of the assignment of the certificate of title. Richardson
v. Seattle First National Bank et al.u actually hinged upon whether or
not estoppel was available as a defense. Because of the statutory definition
of larceny as including the wrongful taking of goods by fraud, it was
held that the wrongdoer had only possession as a result of a larceny by
fraud and could not possibly pass good title to a subsequent purchaser.
Minnesota presents a slightly different situation in that the registra-
tion certificate is assigned by the execution of the bill of sale which is
on the reverse side of the certificate. 12 In a recent interpretation of the
Minnesota statute, it was held by a North Dakota court that delivery
of the automobile together with delivery of such a bill of sale endorsed
in blank by the registered owner to a used car dealer constituted indicia
of ownership on which a subsequent purchaser could rely.'8 However,
the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the same statute differently in
holding that possession of such a bill of sale endorsed in blank did not
constitute the possessor of the automobile the prima facie owner.'4
Most of the reported cases involve only the question of estoppel of
the registered owner and do not consider the validity of sales made
in violation of such statutes. However, Missouri holds that even though
the sale would have been good in the absence of the statute, where the
registered owner had intended to sell the car to the person to whom he
gave the certificate endorsed in blank and where the seller has received
good and adequate consideration, that the title remains vested in the
seller unless the certificate has been properly assigned. 15
Other jurisdictions have also considered the question of whether or
not the title registration statutes are to be considered as being mandatory.
In a recent Ohio decision,' 6 it was held that title to an automobile does
not pass unless the seller complies with the statute17 by assigning and
delivering his certificate of title to the buyer. This decision is significant
because it permitted persons injured as a result of the negligence of the
buyer to secure judgments against the dealer and against the insurance
company that had issued a public liability insurance policy to the seller.
"138 Wash. 2d 314, 229 P. 2d 341 (1951).
12 Minn. Stat. (1949) SS 168.15, 168.30.
18 Comml. Credit Corp. v. Dassenko, 77 N.D. 412, 43 N.W. 2d 299 (1950).
14 Moberg v. Commi. Credit Corp., 230 Minn. 469, 42 N.W. 2d 54 (1950).
'5 Peper v. American Exchange Nati. Bank, 357 Mo. 652, 210 S.W. 2d 41 (1948).
16 Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E. 2d 92 (1953).
17 Ohio Code (Throckmorton, 1948) S§ 6290-3, 4, 5.
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Recovery on the insurance policy was based on the theory that the
purported buyer was using the seller's automobile with the latter's per-
mission.
The Michigan statute 8 is similar to those of Ohio, 19 North Carolina,20
and Illinois,2 1 in that there is no specific provision calling compliance
mandatory to pass title. However, in Bayer v. Jackson City Bank &
Trust Co.,22 the court ruled that the provision calling non-compliance
with the statute a misdemeanor 23 was in itself sufficient to render void
any attempted sale of a motor vehicle where there was failure to comply
with the statutory requirements.
Texas provides a situation similar to that in Missouri since its title
registration statute specifically provides that all sales made in violation
of a statute shall be void and that no title shall pass until the provisions
of the statute have been satisfied.24 For that reason it is not surprising to
note that in a factual situation almost identical with that of the instant
case, 25 the court arrived at the same conclusion. 26 It should be observed
that the court did not place too much stress on the fact that the certifi-
cate of title had been endorsed in blank but based its decision on the
fact that the owner's signature had not been notarized.
Carried to a logical conclusion, it appears that the trend seems to favor
the interpretation of such statutes as being mandatory, 27 with the result
that the sale of motor vehicles would be taken outside the scope of the
Uniform Sales Act.28
Illinois still holds that the sale of a motor vehicle is valid without any
written instrument.29 In L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Pricbard30 the court in-
18 Mich. Pub. Acts (1949) No. 300, § 257.233-.235-.239.
19 Ohio Code (Throckmorton, 1948) S§ 6290-3, 4, 5.
20 N.C. Gen. Stat. (recompiled, 1953) c. 20, S 72.
21 III. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 95 , § 80.
22 335 Mich. 99, 55 N.W. 2d 746 (1952).
23 Mich. Pub. Acts (1949) No. 300, § 257.239.
24 Tex. Stat. Penal Code (Vernon, 1948) art. 1436-1, §§ 33, 52, 53.
25 Hawkins v. M. & J. Finance Corp., 238 N.C. 174,77 S.E. 2d 669 (1953).
26 Erwin v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 147 Tex. 260, 215 S.W. 2d 330 (1948).
27 Compliance is made mandatory by statute in the following jurisdictions: Texas:
Tex. Stat. Penal Code (Vernon, 1948) art. 1436-1, § 53; Missouri: Mo. Rev. Star. (1949)
S 301.210, subd. 4; California: Cal. Veh. Code (Deering, 1948) S 186. Ruled mandatory
by the courts: Bayer et al. v. Jackson City Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mich. 99, 55 N.W.
2d 746 (1952); Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N.E. 2d 92 (1953).
28S 3.
2 9 Pageanas v. Mixon Motor Co., 344 111. App. 446, 101 N.E. 2d 280 (1951).
80 303 111. App. 318, 25 N.E. 2d 129 (1940).
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terpreted the effect of the title registration statutes8' by saying: "These
acts, in our opinion, were not intended as recording statutes and do not
in any way alter, modify or change the effect of the provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act as construed by our courts . -.2 This was reaffirmed
in Pageanas v. Mixon Motor Co.83 when the court said: "It is settled law
in this state that the cited statute is not a recording statute and does not
affect the validity of sale of a motor vehicle which is otherwise valid. '3 4
In the latter case, it was held that title passed despite the fact that the
used car dealer made no attempt to deliver a certificate of title to the
buyer. However, in the earlier case of Rice v. Galkowski,3 5 there was
dicta to the effect that the incompleteness of a purported assignment
would put a buyer on notice as to any defect in title.
There are several factors which might merit attention in this connec-
tion. First of all is the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court has never
ruled whether or not the statute is a mandatory one. Second is the simi-
larity between the provisions of the Illinois statute and those which have
been interpreted in Michigan36 and North Carolina.37 Third is the pos-
sibility that the state legislature may amend the statute to make compli-
ance with it mandatory.
31 I11. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 95 , § 80.
32303 111. App. 318, 323, 25 N.E. 2d 129, 131 (1940).
3 344 111. App. 446, 101 N.E. 2d 280 (1951).
84 Ibid., at 448 and 281.
85 333 111. App. 652 (abstract of decision only), 77 N.E. 2d 889 (1948). Summary of
facts appears in 18 A.L.R. 2d 838 (1951).
86 Mich. Pub. Acts (1949) No. 300, 5 257.239: as interpreted by Bayer et al. v. Jack-
son City Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mich. 99, 55 N.W. 2d 746 (1952).
37 N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) c. 20, S 72: as interpreted by Hawkins v. M. & J. Finance
Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 77 S.E. 2d 669 (1953).
